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Valentine: Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation: Judicial Overst

2008]
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE V DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION
JUDICIAL OVERSTEPPING ALTERS THE IMPACTS
OF NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS AND PREVENTION
OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION REGULATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 9, 2007, in potentially the largest environmental settlement
in United States history, American Electric Power (AEP) agreed to reduce
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from theirpower plants by twothirds by spending at least $4.6 billion on power plant environmental technology improvements and ecological remediation over the next decade.' The
Supreme Court decision in EnvironmentalDefense v. Duke Energy may have
2
persuaded AEP to settle the lawsuit.
The United States contains twenty-five percent of the world's
coal reserves, and American coal-firing power plants comprise
thirty-five percent of total carbon dioxide emissions in the United
States. 3 Moreover, pollution emitted from power plants in the
United States contributes to approximately 23,600 deaths each
year. 4 Additionally, as a result of air pollution, 21,850 people are
admitted to hospitals, 26,000 people visit emergency rooms with
asthmatic conditions, 38,200 people have heart attacks, 16,200 people develop chronic bronchitis, 554,000 people have asthma attacks, and people miss 3,186,000 days of work due to various air
5
pollution-related illnesses.
1. See Steven Mufson, Utility to Pay Large Sum in Clean Air Settlement, WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 2007, at DOI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/10/08/AR2007100801689.html (explaining American Electric Power settlement with EPA concerning damage created by past pollution emissions, environmental remediation, and future emissions abatement).
2. See id. (discussing new coal plant company settlement using Envtl. Def. v.
Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007) as precedent).
3. United States Bureau of Land Management, Energy Food for Thought:
Some Basic Energy Information, http://www.blm.gov/education/00_resources/

articles/energy/energyl.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (emphasizing potentially
destructive attributes of coal-firing power plants and highlighting need for clean
energy alternatives).
4. ABT ASSOCIATES, POWER PLANT EMISSIONS: PARTICULATE MATTER-RELATED
HEALTH DAMAGES AND THE BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE EMISSION REDUCTION SCENA-

RIOS (6-1)-(6-3) (June 2004) http://www.catf.us/publications/reports/Power_
PlantEmissions.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (calculating approximate number
of deaths caused by air pollution each year).
5. Id. (quantifying avoidable health effects from decreased power plant
emissions).

(383)
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Although renewable energy sources like hydroelectric power
and wind energy have recently created a lasting presence on the
power grid, fossil fuels, such as oil, gas, and coal, are still projected
to comprise approximately eighty-six percent of the United States
energy supply in 2030.6 The above-mentioned human illness statistics, coupled with coal's continued prominence as an inexpensive
and abundant source of energy, highlight the need for government
regulation as a means to control emissions and encourage the use
of new pollution-reduction technologies in existing and future coal
plants.

7

Although new technologies and governmental regulations provide the potential for reducing emissions from coal-firing plants,
many plants remain overlooked and unregulated. 8 The Prevention
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations, enacted in 1977, allowed energy companies to continue using existing equipment,
rather than immediately retrofitting their coal power plants with
environmentally-friendly technology, to meet the new Clean Air Act
(CAA) air quality standards. 9 Today, many large utility companies
continue to avoid regulation under the CAA by choosing not to
"modify" their facilities. 10
During the 1970s, Congress enacted New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS) in addition to the PSD regulations in order to
better monitor and enforce the CAA's pollution-controlling strate6. See Energy Information Administration, Overview: Annual Energy Outlook
2007 2 (2007) http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo07/pdf/overview.pdf
(highlighting continued need for electricity from fossil fuels despite emergence of
alternative energy sources).
7. See generally MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, THE FUTURE OF
COAL: AN MIT DISC1PL1NAY STUDY (2007), vii, http://web.mit.edu/coal/The-Fu-

ture ofCoal.pdf (highlighting continuing prominence of coal emissions and proposing methods to limit emissions in current plants).
8. See Energy Information Administration, supra note 6, at 2 (noting need for
governmental controls on emissions).
9. United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 628 (M.D.N.C.
2003) (eliminating incentive to upgrade power plants to conform to current environmental technology standards).
10. See Thomas Gremillion, Case Comment: EnvironmentalDefense v. Duke Energy
Corporation, 31 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 333 (2007) (discussing provisions of
Clean Air Act that grant non-compliance waivers to existing plants until plant is
modified). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) gives various definitions
of the word "modification." United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d at
626. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) define "modification" as any increase in the hourly emissions from a source of pollution. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 60.14(a)-(b) (2000). PSD standards define "modification" as an increase in annual pollution from a major source of pollution. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b) (2) (i)
(1978).
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gies.I The NSPS require all new major coal-firing plants to integrate the most effective emissions-reducing technologies before
beginning operations. 12 In addition, the NSPS mandate that all existing coal-firing plants upgrade their emissions reduction equipment when engaging in plant "modification."' 3 The NSPS define
"modification" as:
any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source that would result in: a significant emissions increase (as defined in paragraph (b) (39)
of this section) of a regulated NSR pollutant (as defined in
paragraph (b) (49) of this section); and a significant net
emissions increase of that pollutant from the major stationary source. 14

Further, PSD regulations implemented the New Source Review
(NSR) program, which requires energy companies operating new
or modified power plants to acquire a permit from the government
before upgrading their plants in a manner that would increase air
pollutant emissions.' 5 In 2000, the Clinton administration and various environmental protection groups brought suit against companies that owned operational coal-firing power plants across the
nation for failure to apply for NSR permits. 16 Energy companies,
including Duke Energy, responded that their plant upgrades did
not fall within the definition of "modification" under PSD regulations. 17 In EnvironmentalDefense v. Duke Energy Corp. (Environmental

Defense), 18 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was obligated to adhere to
the PSD definition of "modification," which cross-references the
NSPS.' 9 Through its holding, the Court created a dangerous precedent by giving the EPA discretion to interpret the word "modifica11. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2007) (explaining
impetus behind creation of new environmental regulations).
12. Liz Darling Edmondson, The Increased Emissions Test Under New Source Review: Regulatory Uncertainty Callsfor an Amendment to the Clean Air Act, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 175, 177 (2006) (detailing origins of NSPS).
13. Id. (defining "modification" of power plants under NSPS rules).
14. 40 C.F.R. §51.166(b)(2)(i) (2007) (defining modification in NSPS
context).
15. Id. (explaining origins of PSD and New Source Review Permit Program).
16. See Gremillion, supra note 10, at 333 (describing origins of suit and constituent parties).
17. Id. at 336 (positing that Duke Energy argued plant upgrades did not fall
under hourly provision in definition of "modification").
18. 127 S.Ct. 1423 (2007).
19. Id. at 1428 (discussing main issue in case and delivering holding).
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tion" differently under the NSPS and PSD programs, even though
the CAA's PSD regulations explicitly incorporate the definition of
"modification" from the Act's NSPS provision. 20
EnvironmentalDefense changed the landscape for litigating cases
concerning "modifications" of power plants falling under the scope
of PSD regulations. 21 Seven months after the decision in Environmental Defense, American Electric Power Company (AEP) negotiated
a settlement with various citizen groups and states. 22 This settlement required AEP to spend as much as $4.6 billion towards emissions reduction measures at their power plants, $15 million in civil
penalties, and $60 million to mitigate existing damage to the
23
environment.
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Environmental Defense. Section II discusses the facts and procedural history
of EnvironmentalDefense.24 Section III outlines the legal framework
behind the case and includes discussions of significant cases, pertinent statutes, and relevant legislative history. 25 Section IV explains
the Court's reasoning for granting discretion to the EPA, including
accepted and rejected arguments. 26 Section V scrutinizes the Supreme Court's decision and reasoning and suggests a different interpretation of the case's relevant facts and statutes. 27 Section VI
projects the legal and non-legal impact of the Court's decision, predicting its effect on future CAA case law and energy industry
28
practices.

20. See Supreme Court Overturns Fourth Circuit Court's Duke Energy Decision, 17
No. 4 AIRPOLC 3.4 (2007) (criticizing Supreme Court's decision in Duke Energy).
21. See id. (discussing implications of Environmental Defense decision).
22. See Mufson, supra note 1, at DOI (using precedents set in Environmental
Defense to lay groundwork for settlement agreement).
23. Id. (explaining AEP settlement terms).
24. For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history of Environmental Defense, see infta notes 2943 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the CAA, see infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Reich Letter, see infra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of case law that supports Duke Energy's position, see infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of case law that supports Environmental Defense's position, see infra notes 87103 and accompanying text.
26. For a narrative analysis of the Environmental Defense decision, see infra
notes 104-26 and accompanying text.
27. For a critical analysis of the EnvironmentalDefense decision, see infra notes
127-45 and accompanying text.
28. For an impact analysis of the EnvironmentalDefense decision, see infra notes
146-72 and accompanying text.
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II.

387

FACTS

In EnvironmentalDefense, the Supreme Court was charged with

determining whether the EPA, when interpreting "modification"
language in the PSD regulations, may determine that a PSD permit
is required if the polluting source increases the amount of pollution emitted per year. 29 Duke Energy replaced plant components
on twenty-nine aged coal power plants from 1988 to 2000, allowing
the power plants to operate for more hours per day30and keeping
the existing plants in continuous working condition.
In 2000, the United States, joined by various environmental interest groups, sued Duke Energy, claiming Duke Energy violated
PSD regulations when it refused to apply for NSR permits for its
plant upgrades. 31 Respondent Duke Energy contended that a PSD
permit is only required when a coal power plant "modification" increases the hourly rate of pollution for that plant, as specified by
the NSPS regulations. 32 Duke Energy did not acquire NSR permits
prior to making these changes because it maintained that energy
companies are not required to do so when power plant "modifications" merely increase the maximum hours of operation and not
the hourly rate of air pollution emissions. 3 - Duke Energy moved
for summary judgment, contending that its actions did not trigger a
PSD permit requirement because they did not increase hourly emission rates.3 4 Persuaded by Duke Energy's evidence of EPA's interpretation of the regulations, as well as statutory language that
addressed NSPS and PSD definitions of "modification," the United
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina en29. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2007) (exacting issue
faced by Supreme Court from lower court decisions). NSPS regulations define
"modification" as "any physical or operational change to an existing facility which
results in an increase in the emission rate... emission rate [s]shall be expressed as
kg/hr of any pollutant discharged into the atmosphere for which a standard is
applicable." 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a)-(b) (2000). PSD defines "modification" as "any
physical change in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary
source that would result in: a significant emissions increase ... of a regulated NSR
pollutant ... and a significant net emissions increase of that pollutant from the
major stationary source." 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (2007).
30. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1430 (detailing effects of replacing tube assemblies in Duke Energy coal-firing plants).
31. Id. at 1430 (describing initial charge by government).
32. See id. at 1430 (explaining Duke Energy refutation to EPA position).
33. See id. at 1430-31 (explaining Duke energy's refusal to apply for NSR permits). "[N]one of the projects was a 'major modification' requiring a PSD permit
because none increased hourly rates of emissions." Id.
34. Id. at 1430-431 (explaining summary judgment argument for Duke
Energy).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008

5

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 5

388

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XIX: p. 383

tered summary judgment for Duke Energy. 35 Furthermore, the district court noted that the PSD statute cross-referenced the NSPS
definition of "modification," which defines the term as encompass36
ing the hourly rate of emissions.
Following the summary judgment ruling, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 3 7 The plaintiffs argued that Duke Energy violated the PSD regulations, not
because of increased hourly emissions, but because the "modified"
plants would increase total pollution emissions and therefore further destroy the environment. 8 In response, Duke Energy maintained that the increased utilization of its coal plants did not fall
within the EPA definition of "modification" found in the NSPS.3 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court ruling in favor of Duke Energy on the grounds that the PSD
provisions cross-referenced the exact "modification" language
found in the NSPS provision and should therefore be interpreted
identically. 40 The court of appeals relied on a letter from EPA Director Edward Reich expressing the agency's view that a PSD permit
is not required for changes in coal power plant emissions that do
not affect the hourly emissions rate. 41 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and vacated the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's
ruling, determining that the EPA's definition of "modification"
only needs to fall within reasonable limits set by the CAA. 42 The
35. United States v. Duke Energy, 411 F.3d 539, 545 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing
district court's statutory and regulatory rationale for holding). In 2007, the C.F.R.
provisions defined "major modification" as: "any physical change in ...
the
method of operation of a major stationary source that would result in: a significant
emissions increase of a regulated NSR pollutant; and a significant net emissions
increase of that pollutant from a major stationary source." See 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.166(b) (2) (i) (2007). The definition of "physical change... in the method of
operation" did not include increases in hourly emissions. Id. The district court
concluded that, because an increase in hourly rate is not included in the definition
of "physical change," Duke Energy did not trigger the PSD permit requirement by
modifying their plant to operate more hours each day. See Duke Energy, 411 F.3d at
545.
36. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1431 (interpreting definition of "modification" to
only apply to hourly emission increases).
37. See id. at 1431 (detailing Environmental Defense's action following summary judgment ruling).
38. Id. (explaining Environmental Defense's reasoning for appeal to Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).
39. Id. (describing Duke Energy refutations to Environmental Defense's
contentions).
40. See id. (stating Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rationale for holding).
41. See Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1436 (using Reich Letter to provide support for
Duke Energy's argument that Congress intended hourly emissions to control
whether "modification" occurred).
42. Id. at 1434 (explaining issue for Supreme Court).
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Supreme Court, therefore, accepted the Environmental Defense's
assertion that annual increases in emissions43 trigger the need for energy companies to apply for PSD permits.

III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Clean Air Act and its Progeny

Congress, recognizing that carbon dioxide emissions have increased dramatically as a result of urbanization and a subsequent
greater demand for energy, enacted the CAA Extension of 1970 to:

(1) protect public health and well-being; (2) facilitate research on
clean energy and pollution-prevention technologies; and (3) coor44
dinate federal, state, and local efforts towards reducing pollution.
Congress amended the CAA, charging the federal government with
45
administering the CAA through a new regulatory structure.
Among the 1970 amendments, the NSPS required all new plants
current emiscreating pollution to install the most technologically
46
available.
techniques
and
equipment
control
sions
The NSPS require all existing major power plants to install
first-rate technologies if the plants were scheduled to be "modified"
and also require all new fossil fuel-based power plants to install the
most current emissions-reducing technology. 4 7 Plants qualify as
having been "modified" if they exhibit "any physical change in, or
change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which
increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or
which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously
emitted."48 The EPA further clarified this definition, noting that an
hourly increase in the rate of emissions qualifies as an emissions
increase.

49

The 1977 CAA Amendments included the PSD regulations to
maintain low pollution levels in areas with pristine air quality by
applying more stringent air quality standards than the 1970 CAA
43. See id. (agreeing with EPA's assertions concerning true definition of "modification" in PSD regulations).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)-(c) (1970) (listing purposes and goals of CAA).
45. See API, Air, http://www.api.org/ehs/air/ (last updated February 14,
2007) (listing key elements of 1970 CAA amendments).
46. See Edmondson, supra note 12, at 177 (explaining origins of NSPS).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (4) (1990) (explaining differences in technology
requirement for new and existing power plants).
48. Id. (defining term "modification" in regulating major sources of
pollution).
49. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2007) (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 60.14(b) (1976)) (refining NSPS definition of "modification" as kg/hr of emissions discharge).
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amendments. 50 The PSD regulations require new and modified
sources of pollution to obtain a NSR permit, which outlines emissions limitations for each individual polluting facility. 51 The PSD

regulations, which cross-reference the NSPS definition of "modification," require existing sources of pollution to apply for a permit
which certifies that their intended "modification" adheres to NSPS
52
and PSD standards.
On their faces, the NSPS and PSD regulations are alike and
similarly define many important terms. 5 3 Under both the NSPS
and PSD regulations, a "net emissions increase" is defined as "[a] ny
increase in actual emissions from a particular physical change or
change in the method of operation," viewed in light of other simultaneous "increases and decreases in actual emissions at the
source." 54 PSD regulations define "actual emissions" as being
"equal to the average rate, in tons per year, at which the unit actually emitted the pollutant during a two-year period which precedes
the particular date and which is representative of normal source
pollution." 55 Lastly, "significant" is defined as "a rate of emissions

56
that would equal or exceed" an EPA-mandated threshold.
The EPA acknowledged that the NSPS and PSD statutory definition of "modification" only includes increases in hourly emissions, but the agency sought to expand the definition to also
include increases in total annual emissions. 5 7 In Puerto Rican Cement
Co. v. EPA (Puerto Rican Cement),5 8 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the EPA's contentions that, if there is the potential for
a power plant to increase production intensity, any upgrades to a
source of pollution constitute a "modification" regardless of the
level of emissions per hour. 59 The court disregarded evidence that
the capital improvements to the plant that almost certainly would
not increase the hourly emissions rate or the days of operation per

50. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1977) (noting impetus behind PSD requirements).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (1977) (discussing details of PSD program).
52. 40 C.F.R. pt. § 51.166(a)(7)(iii) (2007) (providing PSD definition of
modification").
53. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b) (3) (2007) (listing various definitions of
statutory language).
54. See id. (stating definition of "net emissions increase").
55. 40 C.F.R. § 51.155(b) (21) (ii) (2003) (defining "actual emissions").
56. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b) (23) (i) (2003) (defining "significant").
57. See generally Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,735 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, and 124) (defining major "modification").
58. 889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1989).
59. Id. at 297 (agreeing with EPA over application of "modification").
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week and concluded that the cement kiln at issue in the case could
potentially increase total emissions. 60 The Court justified the "actual/potential" method of determining whether a plant upgrade
would increase emissions by positing that, even though a plant may
not be operating at maximum capacity, a "modification" that would
further increase the plant's maximum capacity might potentially in62
1
crease emissions. 6 Duke Energy challenged this holding.
B.

The Reich Letter

In 1981, Edward E. Reich, the EPA's Director of Stationary
Source Enforcement, issued a public letter answering many questions posed by scholars and lawyers concerning the interplay between the NSPS and PSD regulations. 63 As Director of Stationary
Source Enforcement, Reich was responsible for issuing every NSPS
and PSD applicability determination. 64 Reich asserted that, under
the NSPS, pollution emissions are measured by kilograms per hour
rather than by tons per year. 65 Reich also noted that the NSPS differ from PSD regulations "only to the extent that the actual emissions rate of a source is determined at the time of the proposed
change rather than averaging emissions from the previous two
years."

C.

66

Case Law that Supports Duke Energy's Position

In Rowan v. United States (Rowan),67 the Supreme Court held
that a treasury regulation did not define the word "wages" in a manner consistent with legislative history and practical use. 6 8 Like Environmental Defense, Rowan involved interrelated statutes and
60. Id. at 298 (finding PSD regulations properly applied to new plant).
61. Id. at 297 (justifying EPA interpretation of PSD regulations).
62. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1435 (2007) (explaining
Duke Energy's challenge to actual-to-potential method of determining
modification).
63. Letter from Edward Reich, Director of Stationary Source Enforcement,
EPA, to Patrick M. Raher and Stephen A. Goldberg, Hogan & Hartson (1981),
http://www.epa.gov/regionO7/programs/artd/air/nsr/nsrmemos/petrostr.pdf
[hereinafter Reich] (identifying similarities in measuring NSPS and PSD
emissions).
64. See generally id. (describing Reich's position and responsibilities).
65. Id. (explaining NSPS measurements).
66. Id. (emphasizing use of similar regulations for NSPS and PSD because of
functional similarities).
67. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
68. Id. at 263 (comparing various definitions of wages to determine
consistency).
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regulations. 69 In Rowan, Congress passed various federal tax regulations to coordinate the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).7° In Environmental Defense, the PSD provisions were intended to create concrete programs in an effort to enforce the goals of the NSPS. 7 1 Rowan
supports the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's conclusion
in EnvironmentalDefense that, when different statutes provide identical definitions of a word, the agency in charge of enforcing the laws
72
cannot interpret the words differently.
In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (Wisconsin Electric),73 the
Seventh Circuit held that "the EPA's reliance on an assumed continuous operation as a basis for finding an emissions increase is not
properly supported.. . [and concluded that] the EPA's determination that there has been a major 'modification' for PSD purposes
must be set aside. ' 74 The court concluded that the EPA, although
waging a noble battle against the increasing threat of rising air pollution levels, could not be given deference when it redefines terms
in environmental statutes. 75 Wisconsin Electric proved the flaws in
the "actual-to-potential" model utilized by the First Circuit in Puerto
Rican Cement, and the Seventh Circuit consequently determined
that the EPA should measure future actual emissions instead of future potential emissions when determining whether a "modification"
76
has occurred.
In response to the decision in Wisconsin Electric, the EPA issued
a rule replacing the actual-to-potential measurement with an "actual to future actual" methodology to determine whether modifying
a source of pollution fell under PSD jurisdiction. 77 Ultimately, Wisconsin Electric supported Duke Energy's argument that the EPA can69. See id. (finding similarities in interplay of definition of words used in multiple statutes).
70. Id. at 257 (defining "wages" differently in two regulations in order to satisfy requirements of unique regulations).
71. See EnvtL Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2007) (emphasizing
need for consistency and simplicity when defining words in similar government
acts).
72. United States v. Duke Energy, 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding parallels
between Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981), and present case).
73. 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990).
74. See id. at 918 (refusing to allow EPA to reinterpret definition of
"modification").
75. Id. at 919 (concluding that EPA's contentions were not justified based on
plain meaning and congressional intent).
76. See id. at 916 (rejecting actual-to-potential model for defining "modification" in context of NSPS and PSD regulations).
77. See Edmondson, supra note 12, at 183-84 (describing rule change).
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not change the standard of measuring emissions without adequate
78
justification in the definitions.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Chevron),'79 the Supreme Court outlined a two-part test for reviewing the
construction and intended meaning of a statute.8 ( The initial question is whether congressional intent justifies the government
agency's statutory interpretation. 8 ' In cases where intent is clear,
the courts and parties must defer to congressional intent. 82 The
second prong of the Chevron analysis supports Duke Energy's position because, if Congressional intent is ambiguous, the court must
determine whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable in light
83
of the statute's overarching purposes and formulation.
Despite EPA contentions that NSPS and PSD were intended to
achieve different goals, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in United States v. Duke Energy Corp. (Duke Energy) 84 held that the
identical wording of the definition of "modification" in the NSPS
85
and the PSD amendments indicated clear Congressional intent.
The district court judge, acknowledging that the NSPS differs from
the PSD regulations because the NSPS promotes using emissionsreducing technology while PSD regulates local air standards, emphasized that a uniform standard for measuring an increase in
86
emissions was consistent with both programs' objectives.
Case Law Supporting Environmental Defense
In Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States (Atlantic Cleaners),87
a case concerning varied meanings of a word within a statute, the
court held that "trade" could be defined differently throughout the
88
Sherman Antitrust Act because "trade" was broadly construed.
The Supreme Court explained that "[i] t is not unusual for the same
D.

78. See id. (providing support for identical definition of "modification" in
NSPS and PSD regulations).
79. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80. Id. at 842 (explaining rationale for test to determine applicable definition

of statutory provisions).
81. Id. (raising issues of significance behind congressional intent).
82. Id. (noting importance of congressional intent precedent).
83. Id. at 84345 (explaining interpretive steps in cases of ambiguous congressional intent).
84. 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005).
85. See id. at 548 (providing arguments to satisfy Chevron test).
86. See Gremillion, supra note 10, at 337 (maintaining that identical language
and congressional intent promote uniform application of definition of
"modification").
87. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
88. Id. at 435-36 (upholding various definitions of word used in statute).
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word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there
is no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from
giving to the word the meaning which the legislature intended it
should have in each instance." 8 9 Atlantic Cleaners gives weight to
Environmental Defense's contention that "modification" should be
broadly construed to reflect the purposes and goals of the CAA
legislation. 90
Similarly, the Court in Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA
(Northern Plains)9 1 found that the EPA's inconsistent use of the
word "commenced" in NSPS and PSD regulations was proper because the programs were different in nature. 9 2 In Northern Plains
the EPA attempted to define the word "commenced" differently in
two sections of the CAA, adding the phrase "for purposes of this
part." 93 The facts of Northern Plains,however, limit the applicability
of its holding in Environmental Defense, unlike the definition of
"modification," Congress did not explicitly relate the definition of
"commenced" in NSPS back to the definition of "commenced" in
PSD.

94

In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. (Robinson), 95 a dispute arose over
whether the term "employees" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included former employees. 9 6 The Supreme Court held the term was
ambiguous and should be construed broadly within the purpose of
the Act. 97 The majority found that, because the word "employees"

was construed as "current employees" in some instances and "current and past employees" in other provisions of the Civil Rights Act,
the term "employee" must be analyzed in each specific section to
determine its plain meaning. 98 In the present case, Environmental
Defense's argument that "modification" must be interpreted differently by NSPS and PSD is bolstered by the Court's acceptance of
89. Id. at 434 (providing evidence for broad construction of similar words in
legal provisions).
90. Id. (articulating arguments for broad statutory construction).
91. 645 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 1356 (justifying holding by noting that NSPS and PSD cannot be
.commenced" in identical manner).
93. Id. at 1355 (distinguishing definition of "commenced" used in various sections of CAA).
94. See id. at 1352-353 (failing to provide statutory evidence that Congress intended identical definitions of "commenced").
95. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
96. Id. at 346 (dismissing former employee's discrimination suit).
97. Id. (including context and purpose of statute in determining reasonable
definition of "employees").
98. Id. at 343 (holding term "employees" in text of Civil Rights Act has numerous potential meanings).
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various definitions of the term "employees" as found in the text of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 9 9
Finally, in United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. (Cleveland Indians),0 0 the Supreme Court held that the term "wages
paid," written in two different contexts, did not necessarily have the
same definition unless the government agency that promulgated
the regulations offered a reasonable explanation for the contested
language. 10 1 Although "the regulations [in Cleveland Indians]... do
not specifically address backpay, the [government agency] has consistently interpreted them to require taxation of back wages according to the year the wages are actually paid, regardless of when those
wages were earned or should have been paid." 10 2 Cleveland Indians
highlights the importance of agency interpretation and context
103
when determining the meaning of statutory provisions.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Environmental Defense, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's judgment, holding that
the Court of Appeals decision to reduce the effectiveness of the
PSD regulations by aligning the PSD definition of "modification"
with the NSPS definition was a death knell for the PSD regulations. 10 4 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, concluded the definition of "modification" should be based on broad statutory
construction and that the legislative, statutory, and interpretive history of the definition of "modification" indicates differing interpre05
tations of the term in the NSPS and PSD regulations.'
Accordingly, the Court remanded Duke Energy's claim, concluding
that the EPA disregarded twenty years of accepted practice when
10 6
the government agency construed the definitions differently.
99. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1432 (2007) (reconciling
relationship between statutory provision and interpretations in Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997), with Environmental Defense).
100. 532 U.S. 200 (2001).
101. See Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1433-434 (2007) (highlighting reasonability
test to justify government agency interpretation of statutory provisions).
102. Cleveland Indians, 532 U.S. at 219-20 (deferring to government agency's
interpretation of contested provisions).
103. See id. at 219 (analyzing congressional intent when two statutory interpretations conflict).
104. Envtl. Def, 127 S. Ct. at 1432 (explaining reasoning for case holding).
105. See id. at 1432, 1434 (describing overall conclusions of case).
106. See id. at 1436-437 (remanding and deferring Duke Energy's claims of
inconsistent practice for fact-finding).
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Broad Principles of Statutory Construction

The Supreme Court acknowledged that, although there is a
presumption that a word located in different parts of the same statute will usually have the same meaning, most words can carry different meanings when placed in various contexts.' 0 7 Justice Souter
stated that, like the definition of "employee" in Robinson, the meaning of "modification" varies according to the context of the statute.10 8 The Supreme Court also cited Cleveland Indians to reinforce
the importance of context in interpreting legislative intent, holding
that the use of the phrase "wages paid" in two different contexts was
necessary but not sufficient to justify identical interpretations. 10 9
The majority in Environmental Defense found that, despite the
presence of relation back language in the PSD program's technical
amendments to the NSPS, the EPA still retained the ability to interpret the statutes in a reasonable manner. 110 The Supreme Court's
rationale centered on the absence of an express incorporation of
the NSPS definition in the PSD regulations, rather than focusing on
the cross-reference to the NSPS definition of "modification" included in the 1977 PSD amendments."' Additionally, the Court
used the holding in Atlantic Cleaners to justify the Environmental
Defense argument that an identical provision in different statutes
can be interpreted differently."12
B.

Differing Interpretations of "Modification" Through
Legislative, Statutory, and Interpretive History

The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit's ruling that "modification" should be defined identically in the NSPS and PSD regulations, primarily because the PSD
regulations do not specify pollution rate increases. 1 3 PSD regulations "merely require a physical or operational change 'that would
107. See id. at 1432 (citing Atl. Cleaners and Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,
433 (1932)) (applying case in which identical words are construed differently
within one statute).
108. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1432-433 (comparing definition of "employees"
in Robinson to definition of "modification" in EnvironmentalDefense).
109. See id. at 1433 (2007) (highlighting importance of context when determining meaning of statutory language).
110. Id. at 1433-434 (arguing that government agency must be given discretion to interpret statutes absent clear congressional intent).
111. See id. (reaffirming EPA discretion in statutory interpretation of NSPS).
112. See id. at 1432 (providing instances of different practical meanings of
similar words in statutes).
113. See Envtl. Def., 126 S. Ct. at 1434 (finding Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
language extension unnecessary).
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result in a significant net emissions increase of any' regulated pollutant.,"14 Justice Souter opined that the district court had erred in
concluding that "increases in hourly emissions" could be imputed
into PSD regulations because the definition of "physical change or
change in the method of operation" omitted language concerning
increases in hours of operation.' 15 The definition of "major modification," according to Justice Souter, includes both a physical
change and a net emissions increase, but "a mere increase in the
hours of operation, standing alone, is not 'a physical change or
change in the method of operation."' ' 1 6 The Supreme Court's
opinion in Duke Energy also rejected the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation, which used Rowan as precedent to
demonstrate that Congress intended the word "modification" in the
117
PSD regulations to have the same definition as in the NSPS.
The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between
changing the plant's hours in order to run at maximum capacity,
which does not involve a physical change to the power plant, and a
physical change that increases the output beyond the previous maximum capacity. 118 In Puerto Rican Cement and Wisconsin Electric, the
Court upheld the EPA's exclusion for increased power plant emissions at the existing maximum capacity, and only required PSD permits for a "modification" in cases where a physical change in a plant
allowed for a higher maximum capacity.' 19
Justice Souter disregarded the interpretations of the NSPS and
PSD definitions in the Reich letter, noting that the letter provided
weak support for Duke Energy's position. 120 Justice Souter characterized the Reich letter as "an isolated opinion of an agency official
[that] does not authorize a court to read a regulation inconsistently
with its language."

12 1

114. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b) (2) (i) (2008)) (noting provision's express language omits discussion of hourly bases).
115. Id. at 1435 (finding fault with district court's justification for imputing
hourly rate language on PSD).
116. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (2008)) (finding district court ignored two-part test of "major modification").
117. See id. at 1431 (rejecting Fourth Circuit's reliance on Rowan to justify
similar definitions of "modification").
118. See Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1435 n.7 (proving that physical change is not
needed to increase hours of operation in many cases).
119. See id. at 1435 (reiterating necessary but not sufficient aspect to PSD permits when plants increase emissions).
120. Id. at 1436 (giving minimal deference to EPA director's definition of
"modification").
121. Id. (downplaying significance of one federal official's opinion).
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas disagreed with the
Court's reasoning that the PSD cross-reference to the NSPS provisions allowed the EPA to interpret the definition of "modification"
in different ways. 122 Justice Thomas asserted that Congress implemented the NSPS definition of "modification" and therefore
"demonstrated that it did not intend for PSD's definition of 'modification' to hinge on contextual factors unique to the PSD statutory
scheme. ' 12 3 The concurrence concluded that the majority failed to
rebut the presumption established in Atlantic Cleaners that the same
word used throughout a statute has the same meaning unless other124
wise indicated.
Ultimately, however, the Court found that the definition of
"modification" should be construed broadly based on the differences in congressional intent for NSPS and PSD and that the EPA
retains the ability to interpret the statutes in a reasonable manner. 12 5 The Court, therefore, explicitly rejected the evidence pointing to identical interpretations of "modification" in the NSPS and
PSD regulations.

12 6

V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The majority opinion in EnvironmentalDefense persuasively supports relying on congressional intent and permitting a broad statutory analysis; however, its decision controversially discounts crossreferences of the definition of "modification" available within the
127
text of the CAA and advisory opinions provided by EPA directors.
In holding for Environmental Defense, the Supreme Court failed to
give sufficient weight to the NSPS and PSD regulations' legislative
history, provide consistent interpretation of statutory analysis, or
8
consider the EPA's interpretation of the regulation at issue.12
122. See id. at 1437 (differing from majority opinion regarding meaning of

"cross-reference implications").

123. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437 (arguing that meaning of NSPS definition
of "modification" to PSD regulations is valid despite differing goals of NSPS and

PSD).
124. Id. (finding similar contexts surrounding "modification" in NSPS and
PSD do not invoke different meanings).
125. Id. at 1432 (rejecting Fourth Circuit's rigid statutory interpretation).
126. Id. (explaining final conclusions of case and providing basis for vacating
opinion).
127. See id. at 1437 (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding explicit intent through

meaning of "cross-references").
128. See United States v. Duke Energy, 411 F.3d 539, 548, 550 (4th Cir. 2005)
(noting Congress intended identical statutory definition of "modification" in NSPS
and PSD regulations, and irrebutable presumption of identical meaning). The
Court in Rowan noted "[i]t would be extraordinary for a Congress pursuing this
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A. Legislative Intent of the NSPS and PSD Regulations
The majority in Environmental Defense held that the EPA may
use a reasonability test to determine the meaning of "modification"
because "nothing in the.

.

.

legislative history of the technical

amendments that added the cross-reference to NSPS suggests that
Congress had details of regulatory implementation in mind" for
PSD. 129 The holding in Atlantic Cleaners suggests that identical
words in different parts of a statute can only overcome the presumption of identical meaning when the words are used in a way
that could reasonably have different meanings based on different
1 30
intents.
Pursuant to Chevron, an agency can reasonably interpret a statutory provision if Congress has been silent on the issue.1 31 Unlike
the statute in NorthernPlains,which signaled different definitions of
"commenced" by using the words "for this part only," the statute in
the present case is not only devoid of language distinguishing the
definition of "modification" in the NSPS and PSD regulations, but
it actually provides an explicit reference to the NSPS definition of
"modification."1 32 Congress, cognizant of the controversy over the
interpretation of "modification," decided against altering its defini1 33
tion in the 1990 CAA amendments.
The legislature intended to define "modification" identically in
the NSPS and PSD regulations because Congress did not alter or
clarify the definition in the 1990 CAA amendments. 34 This definition provides additional evidence that the explicit reference to the
35
definition of "modification" in the NSPS was correct.
interest to intend, without ever saying so, for identical definitions to be interpreted
differently." Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 257 (1981).
129. Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1433 (holding that cross-reference does not mandate identical meaning of "modification" in NSPS and PSD regulations).
130. See Atl. Cleanersand Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (determining instances in which presumption of identical definitions may be overcome).
131. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845-46
(1984) (explaining limited agency power to interpret congressionally promulgated
statutes).
132. See N. Plains Res. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 645 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1981) (providing support for finding different interpretations of "commenced"); see also Envtl. Def., 127 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding
explicit intent through meaning of "cross-references").
133. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 182, 104 Stat. 3385, 3417-18
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a) (2006)) (omitting definition changes
to "modification" in NSPS or PSD regulations).
134. Id. (gathering legislative intent within 1990 CAA Amendment from EPA
actions).
135. See id. (setting forth emissions standards issued in 1990 CAA
Amendments).
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Interpreting the Definition of "Modification"

The EnvironmentalDefense majority concluded that the applicable emissions rate in the PSD regulations was the annual change in
emissions and defined the terms "significant" and "net emissions
increase" to indicate annual changes. 13 6 This interpretation ignores both the statutory language surrounding the term "modification" in the NSPS and PSD regulations and the clarification present
in the Reich letter. 137 The EPA clearly defined the term "modification" in the NSPS, using hourly emissions increases to trigger a
modification.13 8 The EPA referred back to the NSPS definition
when defining the scope of "modification" in the PSD regulations
139
as under section 7411(a).
The Supreme Court distinguished the Robinson decision from
the present case because the statutory language in Robinson did not
include explicit cross-references to the definition of "employee" in
a different part of the Civil Rights Act. 140 Accordingly, inquiry into
the definition of "modification" should have ceased because "the
statutory language is unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.' "141
Finally, the Reich letter provides additional justification for
measuring power plant modifications on an hourly basis. 142 Although the NSPS and PSD regulations have different goals, the only
difference between the two regulations (with regard to calculating
emissions) is that the NSPS uses a power plant's actual emissions
rate and the PSD regulations use a plant's two-year average emissions rate.' 43 An hourly emissions rate measurement can adequately monitor increases in both actual emissions and average
136. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1434, 1436 (2007) (reiterating
Supreme Court's conclusion in Environmental Defense).
137. See id. (arguing that "net emissions increase" excludes possibility of
hourly measurements and discounting weight of Reich letters in applying hourly

measurements standard).
138. See United States v. Duke Energy, 411 F.3d 539, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (providing rationale for using hourly rate trigger for modification in PSD).
139. Id. (describing district court's statutory and regulatory rationale for upholding hourly rate to trigger modification in PSD).
140. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (finding no temporal qualifier to signal plain and unambiguous statutory meaning).
141. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron PairEnter.Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989))
(noting that inquiry into statutory interpretation ends if language is clear).
142. See Reich supra note 63, at 1-3 (providing answers to various questions
concerning NSPS and PSD interplay).
143. See id. (highlighting parallels between NSPS and PSD regulatory
procedure).
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emissions over time. 144 Edward Reich verified using hourly emissions rates for NSPS, noting that the emissions rate is measured on
45
a kilograms per hour basis.'
VI.

IMPACT

The Supreme Court's decision in EnvironmentalDefense will prolong the use of the ineffective NSPS and PSD programs and inhibit
the creation of more effective models for reducing air pollutant
emissions. 14 6 The EPA's PSD regulations fail to induce many
"grandfathered" power plants, built during or before the 1970s, to
upgrade with advanced pollution-reduction technology. 147 On the
contrary, the PSD permit program provides an incentive for energy
companies to avoid PSD regulation by simply refusing to upgrade
existing power plants. 1 48 The 2002 CAA amendments, which decreased air emissions standards, further exacerbated the problem
of industry non-compliance.1 49 Consequently, many energy companies refuse to comply with PSD because "the program's complex
150
nature renders compliance difficult.'
In 2005, despite the EPA's implementation of various CAA regulations to induce plant upgrades, approximately three-quarters of
all power plants were over thirty years old, and most operated without pollution-reduction technology. 151 Additionally, the high costs
144. See id. (concluding actual and averaged emissions can be measured on
hourly basis).
145. See id. (reaffirming increase in kg/hr of emissions as basis for triggering
modification in NSPS).
146. See Edmondson, supra note 12, at 193 (explaining impracticability of current PSD regulations).
147. See id. at 194 (highlighting inefficiencies and challenges of PSD).
148. See U.S. Entvl. Prot. Agency, Compliance and Enforcement National Priority: Clean Air Act, New Source Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(Nov. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/data/planning/priorities/fy2005prioritycaansrpsd.pdf (explaining reasons for non-compliance with NRS/PSD).
149. Deepa Varadarajan, Billboardsand Big Utilities:Borrowing Land Use Concepts
to Regulate "NonconformingSources" Under the Clean Air Act, 112 YALE L.J. 2553, 2554
(2003) (identifying grandfathering as compounding problems of noncompliance).
150. See id. at 2555 (citing difficulties enforcing PSD for modified sources).
151. SeeJohn Paul, Supervisor of the Dayton Area Regional Air Pollution Control Agency, Testimony of the State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials on the Need for
Multi-Emission Legislation before the Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, and
Climate Change of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Association of Local Air Pollutant Control Officials (January 26, 2005), http://www.
4cleanair.org/SenateMulti-PTestimony-012405.pdf (highlighting energy industry
incentives to not upgrade plants).
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associated with installing pollution-reducing technology deterred
the modification of aging plants.1 52 The PSD regulations, thereplants and permit
fore, impose high burdens on new and modified 153
the overutilization of older, less efficient plants.
On its face, Environmental Defense's victory points towards
positive effects for environmental interests.' 54 For example, the Environmental Defense decision expands the definition of "modification" to include net annual emissions, thus bringing additional
varieties of power plant "modifications" under the purview of
PSD.1 55 A decision for Duke Energy could have been a death knell
for the PSD regulations, forcing legislators to spend excessive time
and money creating a new plan for reducing air pollution
56
emissions.'
On October 9, 2007, AEP narrowly avoided trial in federal
court in Columbus, Ohio by agreeing to an exceptionally high $4.6
billion settlement.157 The settlement required spending corporate
funds to bring its inefficient power plants into compliance with pollution-control regulations and restore the surrounding environment. 15 8 Although AEP contends that it was planning on
upgrading the power plant pollution-control systems before the
threat of litigation, Environmental Defense may have contributed to
AEP's decision to settle the lawsuit.' 59 This settlement highlights a
possible trend of industry deference to Environmental Defense and
new opportunities for environmental groups to enforce PSD and
1 60

NSPS provisions.

152. See U.S. Entvl. Prot. Agency, supranote 148 (showing high cost of upgrading coal plants).
153. See Gremillion, supra note 10, at 343 (concluding that NSR/PSD regulations could actually increase levels of air pollution emissions through inverse
incentives).
154. See generally id. at 343-45 (granting EPA authority to enforce that Duke
Energy upgrade pollution-control equipment).
155. See Envil. Def. v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 (2007) (arguing that
.net emissions increase" excludes possibility of hourly measurements).
156. See Gremillion, supra note 10, at 344 (noting that decision for Duke Energy would have rendered PSD useless).
157. See Mufson, supra note 1, at DOI (explaining AEP settlement to reduce its
emissions by two-thirds within ten years).
158. See id. (explaining AEP settlement terms which includes $15 million in
civil penalties and $60 million to clean up damaged areas).
159. See id. (explaining AEP motivation for settling with potential plaintiffs).
160. See generally id. (identifying possibilities for future enforcement action
against power companies).
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The EnvironmentalDefense holding could, however, work against
environmental interests.' 6' "Granting [the] EPA broad authority to
construe the Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes may
come back to haunt environmentalists" because the administration
could use their broad discretion to "reasonably" interpret EPA statutes in favor of the energy industry.' 6 2 The United States government and the EPA must use a different approach to more
effectively limit the amount of air pollution that fossil fuel plants
63
emit.1
Some scholars advocate repealing the PSD regulations and
mandating that all "grandfathered" power plants immediately upgrade their pollution-control equipment to the current EPA standards. 164 This dangerous suggestion would cause energy
companies to lose billions of dollars and would shut down a large
portion of the power grid for an extended period of time.1 6 5 Instead, Congress should enact a law creating a longitudinal phase-in
mandate for all "grandfathered" power plants. 16 6 This would grant
energy companies a five or ten year window to determine which
and which must be
power plants could be upgraded cost-effectively
67
together.
all
demolished and replaced
Other proponents of abolishing the PSD regulations advocate
implementing a cap-and-trade program: a system setting a limit for
total air emissions.1 68 Such a program would distribute credits
among the energy companies and induce the companies to buy and
sell credits when emission demands rise and fall.1 69 The mandatory
161. See generally id. at 341 (explaining environmental drawbacks to majority
holding in Environmental Defense).
162. See Gremillion, supra note 10, at 341 (outlining potential for administrative abuse of EPA-related statutes).
163. See Edmondson, supra note 12, at 194 (advocating for new regulation
programs to replace ineffective PSD regulations).
164. See id. (explaining need for mandate resulting from ineffective prior
programs).
165. See Victor Flatt, Ctr. For Progressive Reform, Grandfathered Air Pollution Sources and New Source Review (2005), http://www.progressivereform.org/
perspectives/grandfather.cfm (acknowledging failure of PSD and advocating definite timeframe for upgrading "grandfathered" plants).
166. See id. (seeking measures forcing power companies to upgrade
grandfathered plants with emissions-reducing technology).
167. See id. (noting five-year phase-in policy aiming to reduce economic costs
to energy industry).
168. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Air Market Programs, Cap and Trade: Essentials, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/cap-trade/docs/ctessentials.pdf (introducing possibility of implementing cap-and-trade program to reduce pollution
emissions from coal-firing power plants).
169. See id. (explaining basics of cap-and-trade program).
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cap on emissions would allow the EPA to directly control the
amount of aggregate emissions from power sources on a regional or
70
national scale.'
The Supreme Court decision in Environmental Defense cements
the status of PSD provisions as a viable regulation by broadening
the types of power plant "modifications" that fall within their
scope. 17 1 What is unclear, however, is whether stronger enforcement of PSD regulations will bring the energy industry into compliance or if Congress needs to enact a more effective, long-term
solution to rein in power plant emissions and improve ambient air
172
quality for all Americans.
John Marshall Valentine
170. See id. (displaying advantages of cap-and-trade program over
alternatives).
171. See Gremillion, supra note 10, at 333 (allowing EPA discretion in enforcing power plant upgrades with emissions-reducing technology).
172. See id. (analyzing short and long-term implications of Supreme Court decision in EnvironmentalDefense).
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEARING BOARD REVIEW
The Villanova Environmental Law Journal is proud to publish
the Environmental Hearing Board Review. The Review provides
Casenotes and Comments reflecting upon decisions of the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board and areas of the law pertinent to practitioners before the Board. The Review seeks to
contribute to the practice of and to promote the scholarship of environmental law in Pennsylvania.
Consisting of five appointed judges, the Environmental Hearing Board is a statutorily created agency with state-wide trial court
jurisdiction over certain environmental cases and appellate jurisdiction over actions of the Department of Environmental Protection.
Appeals from the Board are taken to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.
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